Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
1 Introduction 1 that have been applied successfully to asset pricing. 6 The top income quintile in our model owns 100 percent of the productive capital stock-a setup that roughly approximates the highly-skewed distribution of U.S. …nancial wealth. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Wol¤ (2010, p.44) …nds that the share of total …nancial wealth owned by the top quintile of U.S. households remained steady at around 92 percent from 1983 to 2007. Shares of corporate stock are an important component of …nancial wealth, representing claims to the physical capital of …rms. As recently as 1995, the lowest 75 percent of U.S. households sorted by wealth owned less than 10 percent of stocks. 7 Our tractable economic model delivers approximate decision rules for consumption and investment that depend on income share variables, distortionary tax wedges, and the level of real output. The income share variables enter the model via stochastic exponents in a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, along the lines of Young (2004) , Ríos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010) , and Lansing (2015) . But in contrast to these papers, we assume that the exponent shifts are permanent rather than temporary. Our modeling strategy is similar to Goldin and Katz (2007) who allow for permanent shifts in the share parameters of a constant elasticity of substitution production function as a way of capturing technologyinduced changes in the demand for skilled versus unskilled labor. Here we remain agnostic about the underlying causes of the production function shifts and focus on the resulting consequences for welfare. Tax wedges enter the model via the budget constraints of the agents and the government. We allow for a distortionary income tax and a variable that governs the fraction of investment that can be "expensed,"or immediately deducted from taxable income.
As inputs to the model, we incorporate the observed U.S. time paths of the top quintile income share and capital's share of total income, as plotted in the right panels of Figure 1.
Given these time paths from the data, we solve for time series of (unobservable) tax wedges and productivity shocks so that the model exactly replicates the observed trajectories of the following U.S. macroeconomic variables over the period 1970 to 2013: (1) real per capital output, (2) real per capita aggregate consumption, (3) real per capita nonresidential private investment, (4) real per capita government consumption and investment, and (5) real per capita government transfer payments to individuals. 8 Figure 2 plots the latter four variables as ratios relative to real output. 9 6 See, for example, Danthine, Donaldsen, and Siconol… (2008) , Guvenen (2009) , and Lansing (2015) . 7 See Heaton and Lucas (2000) , Figure 3, p. 224. 8 Our methodology is conceptullally similar to that of Chari, McGrattan, and Kehoe (2007) who develop a quantitative model with four "wedges" that relate to labor, investment, productivity, and government consumption. 9 Nominal personal consumption expenditures are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Given time series for the income shares, tax wedges, and productivity shocks, we use the model's decision rules to construct individual consumption paths for the capital owners and workers. Our procedure ensures that the individual consumption paths that we use to evaluate welfare are consistent with the evolution of the U.S. macro variables over the period 1970 to 2013.
Welfare e¤ects are measured by the percentage change in per-period consumption that makes each type of agent indi¤erent between the baseline simulation and a counterfactual scenario in which income shares and the transfer-output ratio are held constant at year 1970 values. Both scenarios employ the same time series of distortionary tax wedges and productivity shocks to isolate the e¤ects of rising income inequality, as opposed to changes in tax policy or changes in the business cycle. An advantage of our quantitative modeling approach is that it allows us to construct a clean counterfactual scenario. In contrast, a purely empirical analysis based on ex post observed U.S. data cannot take into account how the economy would have evolved in the absence of shifting income shares and rising transfer payments. For the baseline model simulation, the welfare gain for capital owners is 3.7% of their perperiod consumption while workers su¤er a welfare loss of 1.4% of their per period consumption.
These results re ‡ect changes in the time pattern of consumption for each type of agent in both the short-run and the long-run. Due to discounting, the short-run changes in consumption are more important for welfare. From 1970 to 2013, consumption growth for capital owners exhibits a higher mean and a lower volatility relative to the counterfactual. In the long-run, the capital owner's consumption undergoes a permanent upward level shift of 22.4% relative to the counterfactual scenario.
The worker's consumption falls below the counterfactual path during a substantial portion of the period from 1970 to 2013. But much later in the simulation, around the year 2040, the worker's consumption actually surpasses the counterfactual path, eventually leading to a permanent upward level shift of 10.3% relative to the counterfactual. But these long-run consumption gains are heavily discounted in the welfare computation. Experiments with the model show that implementing a linear transition path for the income shares (while preserving the endpoints) improves the welfare outcomes for both types of agents; capital owners now achieve a gain of 4.8% while the loss for workers is smaller at 0.35%. This result highlights the importance of accurately modeling the historical paths of the U.S. income shares. In contrast, shutting o¤ the model productivity shocks has only a minor e¤ect on the welfare outcomes.
An important unsettled issue in the literature is the degree to which rising U.S. income Nominal transfer payments to individuals are from FRED and are de ‡ated by the NIPA price index for personal consumption expenditures. Real output is de…ned as the sum of real consumption, real private investment and real government consumption and investment. Population data are from NIPA 3 inequality has translated into rising consumption inequality. Empirical studies by Krueger and Perri (2006) and Meyer and Sullivan (2013) …nd that the rise in U.S. consumption inequality has been less-pronounced than the rise in income inequality. Aguiar and Bils (2015) and Attanasio, et al. (2012) argue that consumption inequality, when measured in a di¤erent manner, appears to closely track income inequality. In our baseline simulation, the consumption share of the top quintile (capital owners) rises more gradually than their pre-tax income share. Speci…cally, the consumption share of capital owners rises by less than 3 percentage points while their pre-tax income share rises by 8 percentage points. We show that the model's prediction for the capital owners'consumption share tracks reasonably well with data on the consumption share of high income households (80th through 95th percentiles) from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) over the period 1980 to 2010.
We also examine the model's prediction for the behavior of real equity values over the period 1970 to 2013. Not surprisingly, the market value of the S&P 500 is far more volatile than the model equity value. Nevertheless, the correlation coe¢ cient between changes in the S&P 500 market value and changes in the model equity value is 0.25. This result is consistent with recent research which …nds that "factor share shocks" are an important driver of U.S. stock market ‡uctuations (Greenwald, Lettau, and Ludvigson 2014, Lansing 2015) .
As part of our sensitivity analysis, we consider how di¤erent categories of income contribute to the welfare e¤ects of the transition. All else equal, when capital's share of total income is held constant at its 1970 value of 35% (rather than increasing to 44%), capital owners su¤er a welfare loss of 0.34% while workers enjoy a welfare gain of 5.8%. When the ratio of redistributive transfers to output is held constant at its 1970 value of 7.4% (rather than increasing to 14.6%), workers su¤er a large welfare loss of 10.7% versus a loss of 1.4% in the baseline simulation. This result suggests that the historical pattern of U.S. transfer payments has been very e¤ective in mitigating the negative impacts of rising income inequality.
As a supplement to the positive analysis summarized above, we undertake two normative experiments. Taking the paths of the U.S. pre-tax income shares as given, we solve for the optimal time series of redistributive transfers that equalizes agents' marginal utility of consumption each period from 1971 onwards. We assume that the social planner …nances the new level of transfers and other government spending by adjusting the path of the income tax rate relative to the baseline simulation, but with other relevant variables equal to those in the baseline simulation. We …nd that the optimal transfer-output ratio must rise to around 37%
by the year 2013. Relative to the counterfactual scenario (no change in income shares or the transfer-output ratio), capital owners su¤er a welfare loss of 36.8% while workers enjoy a gain of 17%.
As a more realistic normative experiment, we compute a Pareto-improving time series of transfers that delivers equal welfare gains to capital owners and workers over the simulation.
In this case, the transfer-output ratio must rise to around 18% percent by the year 2013somewhat higher than the actual value of 14.6% observed in the data. The welfare gain for both types of agents turns out to be rather small-only 0.28% of per-period consumption. This is due to the need for a higher tax rate path to …nance the higher level of transfers.
Still, the experiment suggests that realistic policy actions could be e¤ective in mitigating the negative impacts of rising income inequality.
Related Literature
Our analysis examines the consequences of rising inequality that is driven by gains in top incomes, de…ned here as the highest 20% of earners. In contrast, the vast majority of previous research has focused on inequality that is driven by the rising wage premium of college-educated workers. 10 Our framework takes into account the simultaneous shifts in the distribution of both labor and capital incomes in U.S. data. According to Alvaredo, et al. (2013) , the increased correlation between top labor incomes and top capital incomes is an important but often-overlooked factor contributing to the rise in U.S. income inequality.
As an alternative to technological explanations for rising income inequality (such as shifting production functions), Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) argue that the dramatic rise in top incomes has been driven mainly by institutional changes which strengthened the bargaining power of top earners at the expense of lower earners. According to this "grabbing hand" theory, the shift in bargaining power has enabled rent-seeking top earners to successfully push their pay above their marginal product. While the grabbing-hand theory may have di¤erent implications for social welfare, the welfare consequences for each class of agents would still be linked to the resulting paths for their income and consumption, which our quantitative analysis explicitly takes into account. Kumhof, Rancière, and Winantet (2015) consider an endowment economy where rising income inequality (as measured by the income share of the top 5% of households) is driven by a exogenous stochastic process with a unit root. They do not consider welfare but instead focus on the links between rising inequality, increased household leverage, and the risk of a …nancial crisis.
Model
The model consists of workers, capital owners, competitive …rms, and the government. There are n times more workers than capital owners, with the total number of capital owners normal-ized to one. Naturally, the …rms are owned by the capital owners. Workers and capital owners both supply labor to the …rms inelastically, but in di¤erent amounts. 11 The government levies distortionary taxes on both types of agents to …nance public consumption expenditures and redistributive transfers.
Workers
The individual worker's decision problem is to maximize
subject to the budget constraint
where E t represents the mathematical expectation operator, is the subjective time discount factor, c w t is the individual worker's consumption, w w t is the worker's competitive market wage,`w t =`w is the constant supply of labor hours per worker, and t is the income tax rate.
Workers are assumed to incur a transaction cost for saving or borrowing small amounts which prohibits their participation in …nancial markets. As a result, they simply consume their resources each period, consisting of after-tax labor income w w t`w t (1 t ) and a per-worker transfer payment T t =n received from the government.
Capital Owners
Capital owners represent the top quintile of earners. Their decision problem is to maximize
where c c t is the individual capital owner's consumption and`c t =`c is the constant supply of labor hours. The symbol i t represents investment in physical capital k t . For simplicity, we assume that the functional form of the utility function, the discount factor ; and the income tax rate t are the same for both capital owners and workers. Capital owners derive income by supplying labor and capital services to …rms. They earn a wage w c t for each unit of labor 1 1 The model setup is similar to a standard framework that is often used to study optimal redistributive capital taxation. See, for example, Judd (1985) , Lansing (1999) , and Krusell (2002) . In these examples, however, capital owners do not supply labor. 6 employed by the …rm and receive the rental rate r t for each unit of physical capital used in production. (4) is given by the expression in parentheses. Following Cassou and Lansing (2006) , we allow for di¤erential tax treatment of labor and capital incomes via the wedge t 2 [0; 1] which represents the fraction of investment that can be "expensed," or immediately deducted from taxable income. For comparison with the U.S. tax system, t can be interpreted as an index number that summarizes the various elements of the tax code that encourage saving or investment. These elements include the depreciation allowance for physical capital, the tax-deferred status of saving done through pensions, 401(k)s or IRAs, and the favorable tax treatment of long-term capital gains. When t = 1; capital owners are subjected to a pure consumption tax. 12
Taxable income in equation
Resources devoted to investment augment the stock of physical capital according to the law of motion
with k 0 given. The parameter 2 (0; 1] is the elasticity of new capital with respect to new investment. When < 1; equation (5) re ‡ects the presence of capital adjustment costs. 13 We use the capital law of motion to eliminate i t from the budget constraint (4).
The capital owner's …rst-order condition with respect to k t+1 is given by
where M c t+1 c c t+1 =c c t 1 is the capital owner's stochastic discount factor. 14 The …rst-order condition takes the form of a standard asset pricing equation where p t = (1 t t )i t = is the market value of the capital owner's equity shares in the …rm. These equity shares entitle the capital owner to a perpetual stream of dividends d t+1 starting in period t + 1: The model's adjustment cost speci…cation (5) implies a direct link between equity values and investment.
This feature is consistent with the observed low-frequency comovement between the real S&P 500 stock market index and real business investment in recent decades, as documented by Lansing (2012) . 1 2 When t = 1; the capital owner's budget constraint can be rewritten as: (1 + c;t) ct + it = w c t`c t + rtkt; where c;t is the consumption tax rate given by c;t = t= (1 t) : 1 3 Since equation (5) can be written as kt+1=kt = B (it =kt) ; our adjustment cost speci…cation can be viewed as a log-linearized version of the following law of motion employed by Jermann (1998) 
For details, see Lansing (2012) , p. 467. 1 4 After taking the derivitive of the capital owner's Lagrangian with respect to kt+1; we have multiplied both sides of the resulting expression by the ratio kt+1=c c t which is known at time t: 7
Firms
Identical competitive …rms are owned by the capital owners and produce output according to the technology
with z 0 and s 0 given. In equation (7), z t represents a labor-augmenting "productivity shock" that evolves as a random walk with drift. The drift parameter determines the trend growth rate of the economy. The shock innovation " t is normally and independently distributed (N ID) with mean zero and variance 2 " : Stochastic shifts in the the production function exponents t and t represent "distribution shocks"along the lines of Young (2004), Ríos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010), and Lansing (2015) . Given the Cobb-Douglas form of the production function, t is capital's share of income, t + t (1 t ) is the top quintile income share, t (1 t ) is the labor income share of the capital owners, and (1 t ) (1 t ) is the income share of the workers, representing the bottom four quintiles.
Recall from Figure 1 that the U.S. income shares exhibit sustained upward trends over the period 1970 to 2013. To facilitate a solution of the model in terms of stationary variables, we de…ne the variable s t as the ratio of capital's share of income to the top quintile income share. Figure 3 shows that the empirical counterpart of s t in U.S. data appears to be stationary but persistent. To capture this feature of the data, we postulate that s t in the model evolves according to the law of motion (10) with persistence parameter and innovation variance 2 u : Pro…t maximization by …rms yields the following factor prices
which re ‡ect the constant labor supplies`c and`w: 8
Government
The government collects tax revenue from capital owners and workers in order to …nance expenditures on public consumption and redistributive transfers. We assume that the government's budget constraint is balanced each period, as given by
where g t is public consumption and T t is aggregate redistributive transfers. The balancedbudget constraint can be viewed as an approximation to the consolidated budgets of federal, state, and local governments. Public consumption does not provide direct utility to either capital owners or workers. Nevertheless, we include g t in our analysis to obtain quantitatively realistic tax rates during the transition period from 1970 to 2013.
Decision Rules and Computation
Given that labor supply is inelastic, workers simply consume their after-tax income plus transfers each period according to their budget constraint (2). In equilibrium, the individual worker's consumption is given by
A convenient property of our setup is that we do not need to specify the laws of motion for the tax wedges t and t in order to solve for the capital owner's allocations. 15 In our quantitative analysis, we treat the tax wedges as unobservable and solve for time series of t and t that allow the model to exactly replicate the observed time paths of the four U.S. macroeconomic ratios plotted in Figure 2 . Simultaneously, we solve for a time series of productivity shocks z t that cause the model to exactly replicate the denominator of the U.S. macroeconomic ratios, i.e., real per capita output over the period 1970 to 2013, where the level of real output in 1970 is normalized to 1.0. The time series for the state variable s t is taken directly from U.S. data, as plotted in Figure 3 . Afterwards, we use the laws of motion for the shocks (8) and (10) to recover the time series of innovations " t and u t : For periods beyond 2013, we assume that all shock innovations are zero, while income shares, tax wedges, and the various macroeconomic ratios remain constant at year 2013 values. Further details regarding our simulation procedure are contained in Appendix B. Mean log equity return = 5.25%, 1970 to 2013. A 0:5176 The initial capital income share 0 is set to match the 1970 observed value of 0.35, as shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 1 . The initial production elasticity of the capital owner's labor supply 0 is set to achieve an initial top quintile income share of 0 +(1 0 ) 0 = 0:433; corresponding to 1970 observed value as shown in the top right panel of Figure 1 . Given these values, the labor supply ratio`c=`w is set so that the initial wage ratio in 1970 is w c =w w = 2 with`w normalized to 1. For comparison, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010) The value = 0:02 matches the average growth rate of real per capita aggregate consumption over the period 1970 to 2013. Given ; we choose to achieve a mean log equity return of 5.25%, coinciding with the corresponding real return delivered by the S&P 500 stock index over the period 1970 to 2013. 17 The level of real per capita output in the U.S. data is normalized to 1.0 in the year 1970.
Model Calibration
We calibrate the value of A in the production function (7) to yield y t = 1 at t 0 = 1970: The calibration assumes k t =y t = 0:93 in 1970 which is obtained by combining the observed U.S. value of i t =y t = 0:075 in 1970 with a typical long-run value for the investment-capital ratio i t =k t : For example, in a model with no capital adjustment costs, we have i t =k t = k t+1 =k t +1 ;
where is the annual depreciation rate of physical capital. For the calibration, we employ the value = 0:06 which in turn yields the long-run value i t =k t = exp(0:02) + 1 0:06 = 0:08:
Given the calibrated value for (described below), we set the parameter B in the capital law of motion (5) such that B = (k t+1 =k t ) (i t =k t ) ; where k t+1 =k t = exp(0:02) and i t =k t = 0:08:
The parameter governs the strength of capital adjustment costs and depreciation. The value of in ‡uences the coe¢ cients in the capital owner's decision rule
We choose the value of to a achieve the target value e Recall that s t represents the ratio of capital's share of income to the top quintile income share ( Figure 3 ). We choose the parameters e s; ; and u in the law of motion (10) to match the mean, persistence, and volatility of log (s t ) in U.S. data over the period 1970 to 2013.
Given values for ; e x; and e s; and the capital owner's decision rules for x t and i t , we solve 0 and 0 such that the model delivers the observed values i t =y t = 0:075 and g t =y t +T t =y t = 0:383 at t 0 = 1970: A similar procedure is used to solve for t and t for each t > t 0 ; as described in Appendix B.
After computing the time series of productivity shocks z t that cause the model to exactly replicate the path of U.S. real per capita output, we use the law of motion (8) to recover the implied sequence of innovations " t ; with z t = 0 at t 0 = 1970: The standard deviation of the implied shock innovations turns out to be " = 0:0404: The corresponding standard deviation of output growth in both the model and the data is 1.7% over the period 1970 to 2013.
Intuition for the Results
Before moving to the quantitative analysis, this section inspects the basic mechanism that determines how a shifting income share a¤ects capital owners versus workers. Consider a stripped-down version of the model with no labor supply for capital owners ( t = 0), unit labor supply for workers (`w = 1) ; no growth (z t = 0) ; an equal number of capital owners and workers (n = 1) ; no taxes ( t = 0) ; and no capital adjustment costs such that k t+1 =
(1 )k t + i t ; where is the capital depreciation rate. Output is given by y t = Ak t t : The incomes of the capital owners and workers are t y t and (1 t ) y t ; respectively. In response to a one-time increase in t ; the capital stock cannot respond immediately so the short-run response of output is muted relative to the long-run response. In the short-run, the income of capital owners will rise while the income of workers will fall. These shortrun e¤ects will have a large in ‡uence on welfare because they are not discounted much in calculating lifetime utility.
But the increase in t will also stimulate an increase in i t , thus raising k t+1 and y t+1 . 18 As time goes by, the income of workers will be boosted by the rising level of output. In steady state, (i.e., the very long-run), output is given by
which shows that an increase in leads to an increase in y: It is straightforward to show that for reasonable parameterizations, an increase in also leads to an increase in (1 ) y:
In other words, an increase in capital's share of income will also boost the long-run level of 1 8 The closed-form investment decision rule for capital owners is it = tyt (1 ) (1 ) kt:
income for workers. But since this takes place in the very long-run, the in ‡uence on welfare is small due to discounting.
While an increase in unambiguously bene…ts the welfare of capital owners, the welfare impact on workers will depend on how fast capital and output converge to the new steady state.
Short-term losses must be balanced against long-term gains. 19 In the quantitative analysis that follows, we examine both the short-run and long-run e¤ects of rising income inequality in a realistic model that matches numerous features of the U.S. data.
Quantitative Analysis
We …rst consider a baseline simulation that exactly replicates the observed U.S. time paths of the top quintile income share, capital's share of income, and key macroeconomic variables over the period 1970 to 2013. The baseline simulation is compared to a counterfactual scenario in which income shares and the transfer-output ratio do not change.
As an independent check on the validity of our framework, we compare the model prediction for the path of the top quintile consumption share to data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. We also compare the model's prediction for real equity values to movements in the S&P 500. We then undertake two normative experiments that alter the time series of redistributive transfers and income tax rates relative to those in the baseline simulation. the capital owner's consumption c c t ; and the worker's consumption c w t . For each variable, we compare the baseline simulation to a counterfactual scenario in which the income share variables t and t and the transfer-output ratio T t =y t are held constant at t 0 = 1970 values. Both scenarios employ the same time series for t ; t ; and z t to isolate the e¤ects of rising income shares and transfers, as opposed to changes in tax policy or changes in the business cycle. 20 By holding T t =y t constant in the counterfactual scenario, we adopt the view that the upward trend of T t =y t observed in the data was a deliberate government policy response to the trend of rising pre-tax income inequality. In other words, an upward trend in T t =y t would not have been necessary if pre-tax income inequality had remained low. 21 Later, in the welfare 1 9 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this simple intuition. 2 0 For the counterfactual scenario, government expenditures gt serve as the residual component of spending to absorb any di¤erences in collected tax revenue and transfers relative to the baseline scenario. Speci…cally, we have gt = t (yt t it) yt (T0=y0) ; where T0=y0 = 0:074 in the year 1970. 2 1 Figure 2 shows that Tt=y in the data rose from 7.4% in 1970 to 11.8% in 2005. It remained approximately constant at around 12% through 2007. Then, over the next three years, the ratio increased rapidly, peaking at 15.3% in 2010. The ratio has since come down a bit to 14.6% at the end of our data sample in 2013. While analysis, we will consider an alternative counterfactual simulation in which we allow for rising income shares (as in the data), but hold T t =y t constant.
Baseline Simulation vs. Counterfactual Scenario
The top left panel of Figure 4 shows that output in the baseline simulation falls below the counterfactual path over most of the sample period from 1970 to 2013. The average annual growth rate of y t over the 44-year period is 1.78% in the baseline simulation versus 2.00% in the counterfactual. This result can be traced to the increase in capital's share of income t under the baseline simulation which shrinks the output contribution coming from the model's growth engine, namely, labor-augmenting technological progress as given by exp [(1 t ) z t ] : The slowdown in output growth is consistent with the narratives emphasized by Hornstein and Krusell (1996) and Greenwood and Yörüko¼ glu (1997) whereby a biased technology change initially leads to a measured slowdown in total factor productivity. The lower two panels in Figure 4 show the paths of the capital owner's consumption c c t and the worker's consumption c w t : Relative to the counterfactual scenario, consumption growth for capital owners exhibits a higher mean (2.2% versus 2.0%) and a lower volatility (2.8% versus 3.3%) from 1970 to 2013. Beyond 2013, the capital owner's consumption pulls further away from the counterfactual path. In the long-run (i.e., at the end of a 3000 period simulation), the capital owner's consumption experiences a permanent upward level shift of 22.4% relative to the counterfactual path.
The worker's consumption (lower right panel of Figure 4 ) falls below the counterfactual path during a substantial portion of the transition period from 1970 to 2013. But after 44 years, the level of the worker's consumption is about the same under both scenarios. The volatility of the worker's consumption growth is substantially lower in the baseline simulation (1.8% versus 3.2%). The lower volatility stems from the countercyclical behavior of government redistributive transfers. In the baseline simulation (and in the U.S. data), the correlation some of the run-up in Tt=yt in recent years appears to have been triggered by the government's response to the …nancial crisis of 2007-09, it is also true that the top quintile income share continued to trend upward over this same period. Moreover, the value of Tt=yt in 2013 is only slightly below the peak value achieved in 2010, suggesting that much of the recent run-up may be permanent rather than temporary. coe¢ cient between the growth rate of real transfer payments and the growth rate of real output is 0:47 over the period 1970 to 2013. The consumption-smoothing e¤ect of these transfers is taken into account by our welfare analysis, as described further below. Beyond 2013, the worker's consumption eventually catches up to the counterfactual path around the year 2040. The catch-up is driven by the higher level of investment in the baseline simulation which contributes to more capital accumulation and more output per worker in the long-run.
More output per workers implies more transfers per worker because T t =y t = 0:146 for all t 2013: At the end of the 3000 period simulation, the worker's consumption experiences a permanent upward level shift of 10.3% relative to the counterfactual. Figure 5 plots the time series of the two tax wedge innovations ( t and t ) and the two stochastic shock innovations (" t and u t ) that are needed to make the baseline simulation exactly replicate the paths of U.S. macroeconomic variables over the period 1970 to 2013. By construction, the innovations are zero at t 0 = 1970 and for all t > 2013: The mean values of t ; " t and u t are close to zero over the period 1970 to 2013 while the mean value of the t is positive at 0.016. The resulting net increase in the investment expensing fraction t allows the model to replicate the rising ratio of U.S. nonresidential private investment to output ( Figure 2 ). In the lower left panel of Figure 5 , the identi…ed productivity shock innovation " t is negative during the U.S. recession years of 1974-75, 1980-82, 1990-91, and 2008-09. 22 Figure 6 plots the ratios of macroeconomic variables to output generated by the model. In the top two panels, the baseline simulation exactly replicates the 1970 to 2013 observed U.S. time paths for the ratios c t =y t and i t =y t ; as plotted earlier in Figure 2 . 23 We use the model decision rules to construct paths for c c t =y t ; and c w t =y t which, when aggregated, are consistent with the evolution of the ratio c t =y t in the U.S. data.
In the baseline simulation, the capital owner's consumption increases faster than output such that c c t =y t goes from 20% in 1970 to nearly 24% in 2013 (bottom left panel of Figure 6 ). In contrast, c w t =y t increases only slightly from 10.5% in 1970 to 11.3% in 2013 (bottom right panel of Figure 6 ). The small increase in c w t =y t is due to the rising transfer-output ratio in the baseline simulation which o¤sets the workers'shrinking income share. In the absence of a rising transfer-output ratio, the worker's consumption ratio would drop to 9.4% by 2013. In the counterfactual scenario, the worker's consumption ratio ‡uctuates in response to changes in tax wedges and productivity shocks, but the ratio experiences little net change after 44 years. Figure 7 shows that the rise in consumption inequality in the model is less-pronounced than the rise in income inequality. This is true regardless of whether income is measured before or after taxes and transfers. The model's top quintile income share before taxes (solid blue line) exactly replicates the U.S. Census Bureau data plotted earlier in the top right panel of Figure   1 . The pre-tax income share rises by 8 percentage points (from 43% to 51%) while the aftertax income share (dashed red line) increases by about 5 percentage points. In contrast, the consumption share of the top quintile (dashed-dot green line) rises by less than 3 percentage points (from 32% to 34.4%). The smaller rise in consumption inequality in the model is due to two factors: (1) the rising investment-output ratio (replicating U.S. data) which is …nanced entirely by more saving from capital owners, and (2) the rising transfer-output ratio which helps to mitigate the workers'shrinking income share.
Model vs. Data: Income and Consumption Inequality
For comparison, Figure 7 plots the consumption share of high-income households (those in the 80th through 95th percentiles) using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) for the period 1980 and 2010. The consumption of high-income households is computed using two methods: (1) reported after-tax income minus saving, and (2) reported expenditures.
The consumption share from the …rst method is noticeably higher than that from the second method. This gap is similarly evident in the data reported by Aguiar and Bils (2011) , Table   1 , p. 30. A later version of the same paper (Aguiar and Bils, 2015) highlights the growing discrepancy between the CES expenditure data and the aggregate consumption data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). This discrepancy a¤ects the comparison in Notwithstanding the data issues noted above, the model's prediction for the capital owners' consumption share tracks reasonably well with the consumption share of high-income households computed from the CES data (grey lines). From 1980 to 2010, the net increase in the CES consumption share is 3.1 percentage points using the income minus saving data and 1.9 percentage points using the reported expenditure data. Over the same period, the model predicts an increase of 2.1 percentage points in the capital owners'consumption share.
There is disagreement in the literature regarding the extent to which U.S. consumption inequality has increased. Studies by Kruger and Perri (2006) and Meyer and Sullivan (2013) …nd that consumption inequality has risen by much less than income inequality. Both studies measure consumption inequality using reported expenditures from the CES. However, Aguiar and Bils (2015) argue that the reported expenditure data for high-income households is subject to under-measurement error which has been growing over time. After designing a correction for the measurement error, they conclude that the rise in consumption inequality is close to the rise in income inequality.
Model vs. Data: Real Equity Values
A recent empirical study by Greenwald, Lettau, and Ludvigson (2014) …nds that highly persistent "factor share shocks" which redistribute income between stockholders and nonstockholders are an important driver of U.S. stock prices over the period 1952 to 2012. Along these lines, Lansing (2015) develops a concentrated capital ownership model (similar to the one used here) in which persistent shocks to capital's share of income serve to substantially magnify the equity premium relative to a otherwise similar representative agent model. While asset pricing is not our main focus here, it is interesting to examine the model's prediction for the path of real equity values over the period 1970 to 2013. Recall from equation (6) that the market value of the capital owner's equity shares is given by p t = (1 t t )i t = : Figure 8 plots p t from the baseline simulation versus the real per capita market capitalization of the …rms in S&P 500 stock market index, where both series are indexed to 1 in 1970. 25 The left panel of Figure 8 shows that the S&P 500 market cap is far more volatile than p t in the model. Moreover, at the end of the data sample in 2013, the S&P market cap is about 30% higher than the endpoint predicted by the model. These di¤erences are perhaps not surprising given that our fully-rational model excludes the possibility of "bubbles" or "excess volatility," both which are the subject of a large literature. 26 The right panel of Figure 8 plots changes in model equity values versus those in the data, where each series is scaled by its sample standard deviation. The correlation coe¢ cient between the two series is 0.25 and statistically signi…cant. These results lend support to the idea that there is link between shifting U.S. income shares and movements in equity values. Figure 9 plots the results of two normative experiments in which the time series of government transfers and income tax rates both depart from those in the baseline simulation. In the …rst experiment, we solve for the optimal time series of transfers T t that equates agents'marginal utility of consumption each period such that 1=c w t = 1=c c t for t > t 0 : 27 In the second experiment, we solve for a Pareto-improving time series of transfers T p t that achieves the less-ambitious condition 1=c w t = 1= ( c c t ) where 0 < < 1: We set = 0:52875 to achieve equal per-period welfare gains for capital owners and workers over a long simulation of the model. For each experiment, we compute the time series of income tax rates t that are needed to satisfy the government budget constraint (14) each period, where other relevant variables take on the same values as those in the baseline simulation. Details of the computation procedure are contained in Appendix C.
Optimal and Pareto-improving Transfers
The left panel of Figure 9 shows that T t =y t jumps from 7.4% in 1970 (the starting value in the data) to 30% in 1971. The ratio then trends upwards to 37% by the year 2013, after which it remains constant because income inequality in the model stops rising by assumption.
Interestingly, the correlation coe¢ cient between the growth rate of T t and the growth rate of y t is 0:46 from 1970 to 2013. This is nearly identical to the observed correlation of 0:47 in the data, suggesting that U.S. government transfers exhibit the right amount of countercyclicality. 28 In the right panel of Figure 9 , we see that the corresponding income tax rate jumps from 39% in 1970 to 60% in 1971, and then trends upward to 64% by the year 2013. While …scal policy shifts of this magnitude are obviously not realistic, they illustrate the severity of the actions that would have been needed to achieve consumption equality given the historical pattern of rising U.S. income inequality.
The second experiment shows that much milder policy actions would have su¢ ced to achieve welfare gains for everyone, according to the model. In this case, there is no need for an immediate jump in either transfers or tax rates. The ratio T p t =y t rises from 7.4% in 1970 to 18.2% in 2013. The ending value is not much higher than the actual value of 14.6% observed in the data. In the data, the average compound growth rate of transfer payments is 3.42% per year. The Pareto-improving policy calls for T p t to grow at an average compound growth rate of 3.96% per year. There is a jump in T p t =y t (and T t =y t ) that occurs in the mid-1990s. This feature can be traced to the jump in the U.S. top quintile income share that occurred at the same time (Figure 1) . The income tax rate that is needed to …nance the Pareto-improving transfers goes from 39% in 1970 to 42% in 2013. The ending value is well-within the range of average income tax rates observed in OECD countries. 29 Figure 9 also plots the time series for T t =y t and t from the baseline simulation. The baseline series for T t =y t exactly replicates the U.S. data (Figure 2) . The baseline series for t ranges from a low of 36% to a high of 40%. These values are realistic in comparison to tax rates that have been estimated directly for the U.S. economy. For the sample period 1970 to 2008, Gomme, Ravikumar and Rupert (2011) report labor income tax rates that range between 21% and 30% and capital income tax rates that range between 33% and 49%. Table 2 summarizes the e¤ects of rising income inequality for various model speci…cations.
Welfare Analysis
As detailed in Appendix D, welfare e¤ects are calculated as the constant percentage amount by which each agent's consumption in the counterfactual scenario must be adjusted upward or downward each period to make lifetime utility equal to that in the baseline (or other) simulation. Table 2 also shows the long-run percentage shifts in the level of consumption for each type of agent, measured relative to the agent's consumption in the counterfactual scenario. The last column of Table 2 shows the long-run percentage output shift relative to the counterfactual scenario. The above discussion highlights the importance of accurately modeling the historical paths of the U.S. income shares because these a¤ect the time pattern of agents' consumption and hence welfare. To further illustrate this point, the third row of Table 2 shows the results of implementing a linear transition path for the income shares over the period 1970 to 2013 (while preserving the endpoints). This experiment improves the welfare outcomes for both types of agents. Relative to the baseline simulation, capital owners now achieve a larger gain (4.8% versus 3.7%) while workers su¤er a smaller loss (0.35% versus 1.4%). For capital owners, a linear transition causes t to be higher during the early years of the simulation. For workers, a linear transition causes their income share (1 t ) (1 t ) to be higher from the mid-1990s onwards-a period when their baseline consumption path falls below the counterfactual.
The fourth row of Table 2 shows that shutting o¤ the productivity shock innovations has only small e¤ects on welfare relative to the baseline simulation. The model delivers the typical result that business cycles are not very important for welfare. Interestingly, the historical pattern of productivity shock innovations that we identify for the period 1971 to 2013 ( Figure   5 ) serves to mildly improve the welfare outcomes for both types of agents relative to the 20 no-shock simulation.
The …fth row of Table 2 holds the capital income share t constant at the year 1970 value of 35%. The time series for t ; t ; t ; z t ; and T t =y t are identical to the baseline simulation while g t serves as the residual component of spending to absorb any di¤erences in collected tax revenue. As expected, this experiment leads to much worse outcomes for capital owners and much better outcomes for the workers. Capital owners are now forced to help pay for the rising transfer-output ratio without the bene…t of rapidly rising capital income stream.
The last three rows of Table 2 illustrate the sensitivity of the welfare results to assumptions about the path of redistributive transfers. When T t =y t is held constant at its year 1970 value of 7.4%, workers su¤er a much larger welfare loss of 10.7% versus 1.4% in the baseline simulation. 30 This result suggests that the historical pattern of U.S. transfer payments has been very e¤ective in mitigating the negative impacts of rising income inequality on households who fall below the top quintile of the U.S. income distribution.
The optimal transfer policy that achieves consumption equality from 1971 onwards ( Figure   9 ) produces a substantial welfare gain of 17% for workers. But for capital owners, the much higher income tax rate needed to …nance the optimal transfers produces an enormous welfare loss of 36.8%. Nevertheless, the economy with optimal transfers is still able to achieve a longrun upward shift in output of 2.2% relative to the counterfactual. The permanent upward shift is due to the permanent increase in t which leads to more capital accumulation.
The Pareto-improving transfer policy achieves a small welfare gain of 0.28% for both capital owners and workers. Still, this outcome is a big improvement for workers relative to the 1.4% welfare loss su¤ered in the baseline simulation. Moreover, the economy continues to experience a substantial upward shift in output of 4.1% in the long-run. The Pareto-improving experiment suggests that realistic policy movements in the direction of more redistribution could be successful in combating the negative e¤ects of rising income inequality without sacri…cing long-run economic performance.
Conclusion
Over the past four decades, the U.S. economy experienced a profound upward shift in the share of income going to households who were already near the top of the income distribution. A key driver of this trend appears to be an increase in the rents paid to the narrow group of owners of …nancial and corporate wealth. The economic and political implications of increasinglyskewed income distributions in the U.S. and other countries have risen to the forefront of current policy debates.
Our humble contribution is to try to assess the welfare consequences of rising U.S. income inequality using a standard growth model with two types of agents and concentrated-ownership of physical capital. The model is designed to exactly replicate the observed time paths of numerous U.S. macroeconomic variables over the period 1970 to 2013. The welfare consequences of rising income inequality depend crucially on changes in agents'consumption paths relative to a plausible counterfactual scenario. Our methodology ensures that agents' consumption paths are consistent with the evolution of U.S. macroeconomic variables over the same period. Our quantitative modeling approach has the additional advantage of providing us with full knowledge of the counterfactual scenario-something which is not possible using purely empirical methods.
According to our analysis, the increase in income inequality since 1970 has delivered large welfare gains to the top income quintile of U.S. households. For households outside this exclusive group, the welfare losses have been substantial, albeit mitigated by the doubling of the share of U.S. output devoted to redistributive transfers since 1970. Our analysis of the optimal transfer policy within the model suggests that historical U.S. transfer payments appear to exhibit the right amount of countercyclicality. In addition, we showed that a relatively modest increase in the historical growth rate of U.S. transfer payments (from 3.42% to 3.96%) could have achieved small welfare gains for all households while continuing to deliver signi…cant long-run output gains relative to the counterfactual scenario. Overall, our results suggest that there is room for policy actions to address the negative consequences of rising income inequality.
Two important caveats of our …ndings are in order. First, our framework does not allow us to say anything about changes in income inequality among agents in the lower four quintiles of the U.S. income distribution. A framework with more than two types of agents would be needed to study the consequences of any such changes. Second, we abstracted from endogenous human capital investment which, in the long-run, could help spread the bene…ts of biased technological change to agents who fall outside the top income group.
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A Appendix: Capital Owner Decision Rules By combining equations (4), (11), and (12), the capital owner's equilibrium budget constraint can be written as
Dividing both sides of the above expression by c c t yields
Solving the above equation for c c t yields equation (16) in the text. Equation (17) in the text follows directly from the de…nition of x t :
The capital owner's …rst-order condition (6) can be re-written as follows
where the second version of the expression is obtained by using equation (A.2) evaluated at time t + 1: The third version of the expression employs the de…nition of s t+1 which evolves according to the stationary law of motion (10). Notice that the rational expectation solution for x t will depend on the state variable s t but not on the tax wedges t or t : The tax wedges are subsumed within the de…nition of x t :
To solve for the approximate decision rule x t = x (s t ) ; we …rst log linearize the right-side of equation (A.3) to obtain where the approximation is taken around the ergodic mean such that e x exp fE [log (x t )]g and e s exp fE [log (s t )]g :
We conjecture that the decision rule for x t takes the form
The conjectured form of the solution (A.8) is iterated ahead one period and then substituted into the right-side of equation (A.4) together with the law of motion for s t+1 from equation (10). After evaluating the conditional expectation and then collecting terms, we have
which yields two equations in the two unknown solution coe¢ cients e x and : From equations (A.5) through (A.7) and (A.9), we see that the value of will in ‡uence the value of e
x: To calibrate the value of ; we …rst use the investment decision rule (17) to eliminate the investment wedge t from the government budget constraint (14). Solving the resulting expression for 1 t yields
: Equation (A.10) then implies
Substituting equations (A.10) and (A.11) into the investment decision rule (17) and then solving for q t yields
Next, we choose a target value for the average investment expensing fraction t that is based a standard depreciation allowance with a depreciation rate of = 0:06 and an investment-capital ratio of i t =k t = 0:08: Speci…cally, we choose t i t = k t such that t = (k t =i t ) = 0:06= (0:08) = 0:748: Given this value for t and the 1970 to 2013 average values for the U.S. macroeconomic ratios g t =y t ; T t =y t ; and i t =y t ; we solve equation (A.12) for the target value of q t : The target value of q t implies the following target value for x t = q t = [ t + t (1 t ) q t ] = 0:3350; where we have employed the 1970 to 2013 average value of 0.4727 for the top quintile income share given by t + t (1 t ) : Using equation (A.9), we solve for the value of = 0:0151 to achieve the target value e x = 0:3350: Also using equation (A.9), we obtain = 0:2331 for the baseline calibration.
From equation (A.8) and the de…nition of s t from equation (9), we have
which shows that an increase in t causes the capital owner to devote more resources to investment instead of consumption.
B Appendix: Numerical Simulation Procedure
This appendix describes our procedure for the baseline simulation. Given the agents'decision rules (15), (16), and (17), together with the government budget constraint (14), we solve for the time series of tax wedges t and t so that the model exactly replicates the observed time paths of the four U.S. macroeconomic ratios plotted in Figure 2 . Simultaneously, we solve for a time series of productivity shocks z t that cause the model to exactly replicate the denominator of the U.S. macroeconomic ratios, i.e., real per capita output over the period 1970 to 2013. From equation (A.10) we have t = g t =y t + T t =y t + i t =y t q t 1 q t : (B.1)
Given the observed U.S. time series for s t from Figure 3 , we use the decision rule (A.8) to compute x t = x (s t ) from 1970 to 2013. The corresponding time series for t + t (1 t ) is given by the U.S. top quintile share, as plotted in the top right panel of Figure 1 . These two series are combined to form the time series for q t
x (s t ) [ t + t (1 t )] = [1 + x (s t )]. The computed time series for q t is then substituted into equation (B.1) together with the observed U.S. time series for g t =y t ; T t =y t ; and i t =y t ; as plotted in Figure 2 . This procedure yields a time series for the unobserved income tax wedge t :
Next, given the time series for t ; we use the investment decision rule (17) to recover the time series for the unobserved investment tax wedge t as follows
where q t and i t =y t are the same time series used in the computation of t :
The aggregate resource constraint for the model economy implies c t =y t = 1 g t =y t i t =y t : (B.3)
We take the time series for g t =y t directly from U.S. data, as plotted in the bottom left panel of Figure 2 . The computed time series for t and t ensure that we exactly replicate the observed U.S. time series for i t =y t : Since we de…ne y t in the data as c t + i t + g t (footnote 9), our procedure ensures that we also replicate the observed U.S. time series for c t =y t ; as plotted in the top left panel of Figure 2 . The …nal step is to compute a time series of productivity shocks z t that cause the model to exactly replicate the path of U.S. real per capita output from 1970 to 2013. The level of real output in the data is normalized to 1.0 in the year 1970. We calibrate the value of A in the production function (7) to yield y t = 1 at t 0 = 1970: The calibration assumes k t =y t = 0:93 in 1970 which is obtained by combining the observed U.S. value of i t =y t = 0:075 in 1970 with the calibration target of i t =k t = 0:08: Given the computed time series for t and t described above, we conjecture a time series for z t from 1970 to 2013 with z 0 = 0: Using the agents' decision rules, we then simulate the model. After each simulation, we compute a new time Figure 1 : The increase in U.S. income inequality over the past four decades can be traced to gains made by those near the top of the income distribution where …nancial wealth and corporate stock ownership is highly concentrated. Figure 2 : The baseline simulation exactly replicates the observed U.S. time paths for the ratios c t =y t ; i t =y t ; g t =y t ; and T t =y t over the period 1970 to 2013. The vertical dashed line marks t 0 = 1970: Figure 3 : The ratio of capital's share of income to the top quintile income share in U.S. data appears stationary but persistent. In the model, this ratio is a state variable that pins down the capital owner's tax-adjusted income-consumption ratio. Figure 4 : The …gure plots the paths of model variables in the baseline simulation versus a counterfactual scenario in which the income shares and the transfer-output ratio are held constant at year 1970 values. It takes a long time for the model transition dynamics to play out. All four variables in baseline simulation eventually surpass the corresponding levels in the counterfactual scenario. This gives rise to long-run upward level shifts in consumption for both capital owners and workers relative to the counterfactual scenario. But the short-run consumption paths are much more important for welfare. Figure 5 : The …gure plots the time series of tax wedge innovations and stochastic shock innovations that are needed to make the baseline simuation exactly replicate the paths of U.S. macroeconomic variables over the period 1970 to 2013. By construction, the innovations are zero at t 0 = 1970 and for t > 2013: The vertical dashed line marks t = 2013: Figure 6 : The baseline simulation exactly replicates the observed paths of aggregate c t =y t and aggregate i t =y t in U.S. data over the period 1970 to 2013 (see Figure 2) . We use the model decision rules (15) and (16) to construct individual consumption paths for the two types of agents. The baseline simulation and the counterfactual scenario both employ the same time series of distortionary tax wedges and productivity shocks. Figure 7 : In the baseline simulation, the consumption share of the top quintile (capital owners) rises by less than either their pre-tax or after-tax income share. The top quintile consumption share in the model tracks reasonably well with data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) for the period 1980 to 2010. The vertical dashed line marks t = 2013: Figure 8 : The market value of the S&P 500 is far more volatile than the model equity value. Nevertheless, the correlation coe¢ cient between changes in the S&P 500 market value and changes in the model equity value is 0.25. Figure 9 : The time series of optimal transfers equalizes agents'marginal utility of consumption each period from 1971 onwards. The time series of Pareto-improving transfers delivers equal welfare gains to capital owners and workers over a long simulation. In both cases, we solve for the income tax rate that is needed to …nance the new level transfers. The vertical dashed line marks t = 2013:
